UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22565
3 May 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 26 APRIL 1991 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), whose mandate the Security Council should plan to renew by 31 May 1991 at the latest.

Major-General Adolf Radauer (Austria), who has been Commander of the Force since 10 September 1988, will end his tour of duty on 30 September 1991. Following the usual consultations with the parties, I propose - if the Council renews the Force's mandate - to appoint Major-General Roman Misztal (Poland) to the post of UNDOF Commander with effect from 1 October 1991.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier PEREZ de CUELLAR

91-14625 2319f (E)

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22566
3 May 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 MAY 1991 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 26 April 1991 (S/22565) concerning your intention to appoint General Roman Misztal (Poland) to the post of Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) LI Daoyu
President of the Security Council

91-14631 2532b (E)

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22567
4 May 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 MAY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BRAZIL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Presidential Decree enacted on 30 April 1991 by President Fernando Collor and published in the Official Register on 2 May, whereby the Brazilian authorities are obliged to ensure compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 686 (1991) on the lifting of mandatory sanctions against Kuwait and the provisional maintenance of sanctions against Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ronaldo Mota SARDENBERG
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Brazil
to the United Nations

Annex

Presidential Decree No. 108 enacted by the President of the the Federal Republic of Brazil on 30 April 1991 concerning the lifting of sanctions against Kuwait and the temporary maintenance of sanctions against Iraq

The President of the Republic, by the powers invested in him by article 84 (IV) of the Constitution and in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, proclaimed by Presidential Decree No. 19,841 of 22 October 1946, hereby decrees that:

Article 1: The Brazilian authorities shall be obliged to comply, in respect of their several competences, with the provisions of resolution 686 (1991) adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 2 March 1991, the text of which is attached herewith, which determines the lifting of sanctions against Kuwait, as established in Security Council resolution 661 (1990).

Article 2: There remain temporarily in force the sanctions imposed against Iraq in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 99,441 of 7 August 1990.

Article 3: The present decree shall enter into effect on the date of publication.

Done in Brasilia, on the thirtieth day of April nineteen hundred and ninety-one.

Fernando COLLOR

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22568
6 May 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 4 MAY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that American and American-Saudi aircraft have continued to violate Iraqi airspace, as follows:

I

1. American-Saudi air activity on 1/2 May 1991 amounted to 45 sorties flown by 22 formations and 1 lone aircraft.

2. The altitude of the aircraft ranged between 4 and 8 kilometres and their speed between 650 and 800 kilometres per hour. The aircraft were identified as F-14s and F-15s.

3. Air activity was concentrated over the areas of Baghdad, West Baghdad, Ramadi, Suwayrah, Hashimiyah, Samarra and Mosul for purposes of observation and provocation.

II

1. American-Saudi air activity on 2/3 May 1991 amounted to 50 sorties flown by 23 formations and 4 lone aircraft.

2. The aircraft flew at between 600 and 720 kilometres per hour at altitudes ranging between 3 and 7 kilometres.

3. The aircraft were identified as F-14s and F-15s, and they flew mostly over the areas of Baghdad, Aziziyah, Qadisiyah, Samawah, Kut, Samarra and Najaf for purposes of observation and provocation.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22569
6 May 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 5 MAY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, and further to our previous letters, the latest of which was letter No. 81 of 4 May 1991, I have the honour to inform you that, at 0500 hours on 2 May 1991, a group of an estimated 40 persons coming from the Iranian side attacked the forward Iraqi units opposite Uqdat al-Rawtah in the southern sector with 81-millimetre mortars and light weapons.

This fresh penetration, which is additional to the previous Iranian violations, constitutes a breach of the cease-fire between Iraq and Iran and confirms the persistence of the Iranian Government in its deliberate endeavour to encroach upon the sovereignty and security of Iraq.

The Government of my country once again affirms that the Iranian Government is liable for all the damage caused by this penetration and for all the consequences to which it gives rise.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

91-14762 2250c (E)

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/22570
6 May 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 4 MAY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, and further to our previous letters, the latest being letter No. 79 of 2 May 1991, I have the honour to convey to you the following new facts concerning Iranian actions in violation of the provisions of the cease-fire agreement between Iraq and Iran.

1. On 19 March 1991, the Administrative Officer of the city of Sardasht entered the Raniya border zone.

2. On 20 March 1991, a cartographer from Teheran called Behruz Hashempur entered by way of the Hajj Umran-Shahidan road together with five soldiers of the 64th Division.

3. On 22 March 1991, a vehicle belonging to the Ramadan intelligence centre driven by the Iranian Yadullah Abdullah from the Ramadan centre entered the Shahidan area together with five soldiers.

4. On 25 April 1991, a detachment of the Khomeini Guard entered the Darband-Baylulah area in the Khanaqin sector in order to gather information on the area.

5. Thirty elements belonging to the Khomeini Guard entered from the Bamu area in order to reconnoitre the site of the bridge located in the area of the Maydan-Khanaqin sector.

These fresh violations, which are additional to the previous Iranian violations of the provisions of the cease-fire between the two countries, once again confirm the persistence of the Iranian Government in its continuing endeavour to encroach upon the sovereignty and security of Iraq and in its blatant attempts to interfere in Iraq's internal affairs.

As it has done on previous occasions, the Government of my country affirms that the Iranian Government is liable for all the damage being caused

by these violations. In informing you of these violations, I request you to adopt such measures as are required by the principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter in order to bring them to an end.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/46/165
S/22571
7 May 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Items 29 and 68 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 3 May 1991 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter dated 3 May 1991 from His Excellency Mr. Abdul Wakil, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan, addressed to you (see annex).

I have further the honour to request that the text of the present letter and its annex be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 29 and 68 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad E. ROSHAN-RAWAAN
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/46/50.

ANNEX

Letter dated 3 May 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan addressed to the Secretary-General

Following our conversations on 1 May 1991 at United Nations Headquarters, I would like to inform you of the following:

Over three years have elapsed since the signing of the Geneva Agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which were aimed at ending foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, solving the differences, and improving bilateral relations between the two countries. Based on these Agreements, the limited Soviet military contingent returned to their country over two years ago. The Republic of Afghanistan as a party to the Agreements has always tried to the best of its ability to fulfil its commitments arising from the accords. However, the party, i.e., Pakistan, since the very beginning has not adhered to its commitments - it has stepped up overt intervention in different forms in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. So far, for instance, 13,520 cases of violation by Pakistan of the Geneva Agreements have been reported through 1,881 notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan to the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) and then to the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP).

In pursuit with the humanitarian policy of national reconciliation, the leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan has lately forwarded new offers wherein it has called for living in peace and security with all its neighbours, Pakistan in particular, and has stood for economic and political cooperation instead of military rivalry. But negligent to all these constructive proposals of the Afghan side, Pakistan obstinately keeps on its intervention, including arms interference, in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan. The latest aggression by the regular military and militia units of Pakistan on Khost province is a distinctive example to this effect.

From the very beginning of the preparation for attack on Khost in early March 1991, irrefutable evidence showed that the military quarters of Pakistan had made enormous efforts and were preparing for an extensive aggression. The position of Pakistan's military units, for instance, was changed in the vicinity of Afghanistan's borders for a direct involvement in the aggression and for providing further help and support for the Afghan opposition. For example, the anti-tank batallion No. 37 related to army corps No. 30 was shifted from Gujranwala to army corps No. 11 based in Kohat. The artillery regiment 33 and infantry regiment 80 of the infantry division were shifted to Tal area adjacent to the border. Moreover, the airforce squadron batallion No. 9 related to army corps No. 11 came in a state of stand-by at the vicinity of the borders. The Bano and Miram Shah airports located near the borders were also on the alert.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan warned the Government of Pakistan in this respect through a letter dated 12 March 1991. Likewise, a letter was sent on 19 March 1991 by the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan addressed to Your Excellency.

However, the intervention and preparations by Pakistan not only were not reduced but a direct assault began with the Pakistani forces, including artillery, rocket and ground units involved. Incidents of Pakistan intrusions over the airspace of the Republic of Afghanistan in Khost were also noticed. In addition, the Pakistani forces directly took part in the massacre of local inhabitants and looting of their properties.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan apprised Your Excellency as the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situation through letters dated 23, 25 and 31 March 1991 wherein the developments were illucidated, and asked for the taking of urgent measures to prevent the aggression.

Furthermore, the Pakistani authorities were notified of the matter by protest notes dated 19, 23, 24, 25, 29 and 31 March 1991 to halt its interference and aggression against the Republic of Afghanistan and to abide by the spirit and letter of the Geneva Agreements as an international authentic document.

Likewise, the State of the Republic of Afghanistan publicly stated that, despite the intensification of intervention by Pakistan and violation of the Geneva Agreements by that country, the Afghan side still insists on the political settlement of the situation and called upon Pakistan to display goodwill and to give way to cooperation instead of confrontation. In addition, we appealed to the leaders of some other countries to make use of their influence and prestige for the cessation of Pakistani interference.

Meanwhile, emphatic instructions were given to the units of the armed forces of the Republic of Afghanistan based near the border fully to avoid any steps which would lead to further deterioration of the situation. This instruction was completely translated into practice. But unfortunately, the Pakistani side left without response to these calls and, instead of avoiding aggression and interference in Khost war, it was engaged in strengthening its military units, expediting the dispatch of arms and ammunition and increased its negative propaganda.

The Hindustan Times of 16 April, quoting reliable sources, divulged that right before the beginning of military operations, under the guidance of Pakistan, the American cargo aircraft were loaded with a quantity of arms and ammunition from Saudi Arabia and shipped to Pakistan which were used during the war in Khost. As a result of the intensification of intervention by Pakistan, imbalance of forces and the unfavourable climate, Khost collapsed and the Pakistani units, together with armed opposition forces, particularly with Khalis and Gulbuddin groupings, who were never able alone to implement such a plot, entered Khost.

According to the information of the government officials of Afghanistan, up to 10,000 Pakistani armymen, militias and police, 200 tanks and several artillery and rocket units of that country were directly involved in the combat operations against the forces based in Khost and provided supportive operations. These units, accompanied by Pakistan militias equipped with assorted weapons, attacked the Khost City from the east and surroundings of that province under the command of Pakistani generals named Kazimi and Hariz, as well as Haqani, a leader of the Afghan extremists.

The artillery regiment 66 of the Pakistan army using heavy weapons, staged an attack from Sayed Raki of Miram Shah, the infantry regiment 66 of that country under the command of General Sarwar Khan, together with Egyptian advisers Ziauddin and Omer using 20 tanks, launched their attack from the centre of Miram Shah through Tal on Zadran and Nadirshah Kot areas.

Moreover, the Rawalpindi artillery regiment commanded by Jafar Khan, with 3,000 commando personnel wearing the costumes of the Afghan opposition using heavy weapons, attacked Zahra, Spena and Mangal areas.

Also, a commando unit of the Pakistan army with 500 men dressed in Afghan costumes, attacked Tanai district using light weapons. The artillery regiment 59 of the Pakistan army using heavy weapons opened fire on Ismael Khel area. A group of 500 youth attached to Jamiate Tulaba-i-Pakistan and some Filipinos together with the Afghan opposition making use of light weapons took part in the Khost war under the names of Al-Bader-1 and Al-Bader-2. Even after the fall of Khost, Pakistan continued with its intervention. For instance, on 23 April 1991, two Pakistani nationals, Eshtiaq Ahmad, son of Mushtaq Ahmad, and Tabish Sediqi, son of Abdul Wadoud, attached to Jamaate Islami Pakistan, inhabitants of Rawalpindi, were captured in Wagh Jan Gorge, Logar province, by the armed forces of Afghanistan while perpetrating armed subversive activities against the people and state of the Republic of Afghanistan. A rocket launcher and one klashinkov rifle have been seized from them. In a press conference on 24 April at Kabul, they confessed that, together with three other Pakistani nationals named Afran, Anis and Wais, they had been introduced by Doctor Kamal, a Pakistani citizen to the office of Gulbuddin's Islamic Party in Peshawar for dispatch to Afghanistan 20 days before their arrest. They have also admitted that, with the instruction and guidance of Fayaz, a Pakistani national, they were transferred to Kunjaki area of Logar to take part together with other eight armed persons who were Pakistanis too in leading combat operations against the Republic of Afghanistan in Tangi Wagh Jan, Logar province.

The commando, ground and tank units of Pakistan (about 40 tanks) were seen while committing murder and plunder in Khost after taking over that city. After the fall of Khost, these forces promptly returned to their previous positions. Prior to the fall of Khost, the long range artillery force of Pakistan in Miram Shah (newly deployed there) and the rocket units of that country (based in Ghulam Khan area) were opening heavy fire on the Afghan positions. This fire was made regularly and was professionally managed.

The Pakistani officers had also taken part in the mobilization and governing of the Afghan opposition forces. (Their conversations on the wireless were heard.) Pakistan bulldozers and road construction means took part in levelling the crossing ways for the armoured and transportation vehicles. Meetings were also held at different levels even at a highest level that is, with the President of Pakistan in chair, to organize the attack on Khost and to conduct its subsequent affairs. (Mention was made of it in the protest note dated 8 April 1991.)

According to available information, the order of attack on Khost was given by General Durani, Chief of Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. This condition not only runs counter to our wishes for a political settlement of the situation and the establishment of an atmosphere of cooperation and friendship with Pakistan. It is also a gross violation of the Geneva Agreements resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-fifth session, and the internationally-accepted norms, particularly the principles and goals of the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

After the fall of Knost, the Pakistani forces, together with extremist armed opposition, resorted to looting and destruction of public and private properties, torture and massacre of the civilians, compulsory immigration of the inhabitants to Pakistan, killing and torture of the captives, a situation that is of grave concern for the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan. Two letters bearing complaints in this respect were sent to Your Excellency as the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Likewise, under the protest notes dated 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 April 1991, Pakistan was asked to renounce from open and wicked interference in Khost incidents, i.e., illegal travel by individuals and officials of that country to Khost, disrespect to the dead bodies and martyrs and the mobilization and governing of the armed opposition forces. Unfortunately, no serious action has been taken to prevent and avoid such actions. But in the meantime, the interference by Pakistan has been intensified in other border provinces of Afghanistan like Kandahar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar, Ghazni and Logar. In addition, letters have been sent by Najibullah, President of the Republic of Afghanistan to the leaders of some countries.

Likewise, Pakistani officials, above all, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, a Pakistani senator, General Hamid Gul, commandant of Multan army corps, Colonel Imam and General Durani, Chief of ISI of Pakistan, by trampling down the principles of international law and by naked violation of the Geneva Agreements have entered Khost province illegally, without passports and visas and have met the Pakistani military units and the Afghan opposition groupings.

Some Pakistani Ministers of Parliament have strongly protested and condemned the visit of these people to Khost. Similarly, General Kazimi, a Pakistani national, together with Sayed Ahmad Gailani, head of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan visited Khost on 20 April to talk to and counsel with the local commanders of opposition in Paktia province. On 21 April, they took part in the meeting of the local commanders of the opposition whence Jalaluddin Haqani also spoke. In his talk, Jalaluddin Haqani called on the

commanders related to the Alliance of Seven to give support on their preparedness for attack on Gardez on the earliest. The plan of cooperation and coordination of the activities of the armed groups attached to different organizations for attack on Gardez, centre of Paktia province was assessed in this meeting. Moreover, men of Commander Haqani who declined to expose their identity stated on 14 April that Major General Janjo, Operation Director of Pakistan's intelligence service in Peshawar, will meet in the near future with Haqani and Gulbuddin in Khost. According to the same source, a high ranking delegation of ISI arrived in Khost on 6 April.

Apart from the information given by the mass media and that gathered by the detecting organs of Afghanistan, on the interventions of Pakistan, the following evidence and facts are also available:

1. Pronouncements by eyewitnesses, such as Mirza Alam Hamidi, head of the Exhibitions Department of the Commerce Ministry and a tribal figure, Major-General Abdul Satar, Colonel Bemillah, Major Abdul Zahir, Senior Captain Nazar Mohammad, Senior Captain Shir Hasan, First Lieutenant Najibullah, First Lieutenant Sayed Nazim, officers of the armed forces of Afghanistan, as well as by Abdul Wahab, Abdul Hanan, Sediqullah, Abdul Wasie, Mohammad Hashim, Khwaja Mahtabuddin, Mohammad Shah, Abdul Samie, Mohammad Azam, soldiers of the armed forces who have returned safe from Khost incidents and some of them were even detained for a couple of days and then have escaped from them. Some of these people were transferred to Pakistan and from there they rescued themselves in view of tribal relationships.

2. The assertions by some Pakistani political personalities, senators and deputies to the Parliament, among them, Mahmoud Khan Achekzai and Mujiburrahman, leaders of Pashtoonkhwa National Awami Party, Omar Asghar, Chairman of the Isteqlal Youth League and a member of the National Working Committee of Tahreek Isteqlal Party, Afrasiab Khatak, Chairman of Pashtoonkwa Qawmi Enqilabi Party.

3. Statements by the organizers of attack on Khost, such as Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Liaqat Baluch, Jalaluddin Haqani, and others.

4. Publications by the mass media of Pakistan, countries of the region and world and eyewitness accounts by correspondents of the BBC on 22, 24 and 25 March, Voice of America on 26 March and 2 and 4 April. The Pakistani newspapers Nawai Waqt of 15 April 1991, Muslim of 6 April 1991, Nation of 9 April 1991, and others.

5. The expressions by some Pakistani policemen, such as Abdul Satar and Mohammad Alam, to Afghan eyewitnesses who were taken to Pakistan and then escaped.

The Government of Afghanistan demands the following with regard to the situation in Khost and its consequences:

(a) Cessation of interventions and aggression by Pakistan and full implementation of the Geneva Accords by that country;

(b) Honouring of the safety of the prisoners of war and wounded persons and their humane treatment until their release as called for under international norms;

(c) Cooperation of the international community, including the United Nations, to this effect with Afghanistan.

It should be pointed out that, despite the prevalent situation and the incidents in Khost, the Republic of Afghanistan firmly stands for a political solution of the situation in Afghanistan. This goodwill of the Republic of Afghanistan has been reflected in our proposals to the Pakistani side for the settlement of the disputes through talks and embarking on the path of economic cooperation instead of confrontation which we confirm once again. Likewise, in connection with the Afghan opposition, we consider dialogue and talk as the only way for settling all the problems.

Abdul WAKIL
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Afghanistan

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General Assembly Security Council

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GENERAL

A/45/1008
S/22572
6 May 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Agenda item 43
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 6 May 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter, dated 2 May 1991, addressed to you by His Excellency Osman Ertuğ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mustafa AKSIN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 2 May 1991 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ
addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to a recent interview with Mr. Andreas Aloneftis, the Greek Cypriot Defense Minister, published in the Greek Cypriot weekly Kirikas of 6 April 1991, in connection with the ongoing Greek Cypriot rearmament campaign.

In response to recent press reports in connection with alleged cuts in the Greek Cypriot military spending and the negative economic consequences of the massive military build-up in South Cyprus, Mr. Aloneftis is reported to have said the following:

> "Recently, a campaign of rumors has been initiated. It is alleged that there is a pressing need to decrease our expenditures on arms. This is a totally impudent and demagogic campaign. It is being said that we are buying excessive armaments ... and that the economy of Cyprus would not be able to withstand such expenditures. They even claim that all our rearmament efforts are in vain. I must say, I regret these statements and I am disturbed by them. Such rumors unfortunately lead to a state of confusion and defeat among our people. The proponents of such views are those who mind solely their own comfort ..."

Mr. Aloneftis denied press reports that military purchases would be reduced and stated that in fact the Greek Cypriot administration aimed at acquiring more arms with less spending. This would be done by purchasing more advanced weapons and by bolstering the level of technology employed by the "National Guard". Mr. Aloneftis said that the Greek Cypriot military was now at a level "comparable in many areas to the most advanced and modern armies of our time". He added that the outcome of the Gulf War had shown clearly that an equally effective level of defense could be attained with less expenditures.

In addition, the Greek Cypriot Defense Minister, in outlining his immediate and future military strategies, underlined the need for the formation of a Greek Cypriot air force. He stated that the new Greek Cypriot air force would be functioning in coordination with the Greek Air Force which would complement the Greek Cypriot forces. Mr. Aloneftis announced that up to 50 Greek Cypriot personnel would be sent to Greece periodically for training in order to build an air force of 40 aircraft which would be manned by at least 1,000 qualified personnel.

Mr. Aloneftis then boasted that the Greek Cypriot National Guard was now equipped with sophisticated anti-aircraft systems and that Greek air cover was already in place over South Cyprus. He said the Greek Cypriot forces were not preparing for the "static defense of Cyprus", but were poised for "a prompt and decisive victory" in the island.

The above statements by Mr. Aloneftis unequivocally demonstrate that the recent reports to the effect that any alleged "cuts" in Greek Cypriot military spending would mean a slowing down of the rearmament campaign and military build-up in the South are false and aimed at misleading world public opinion. Far from making any reduction, Mr. Aloneftis has made it clear that his administration would continue to buy more sophisticated weaponry and to equip the "National Guard" with high-technology systems. Mr. Aloneftis even went so far as to attack those circles who encourage less military spending and common sense.

It is clear that the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus, by mobilizing its resources for the purchase of high-technology weapons, has added new and dangerous dimensions to its rearmament campaign. The Turkish Cypriot side deems it necessary to draw the attention of all concerned to this new development which further harms prospects for rapprochement between the two peoples and an early settlement, as envisaged by Security Council resolution 649 (1990).

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative of the
Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus